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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
AUGUST SCHRIEBER, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7737 
APPELLANT'S REPLY TO 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Respondent's theory in this case has, as shown by its 
brief, entirely changed since the District Attorney for the 
Third Judicial District made and filed his petition to vacate 
and set aside the order of October 20, 1949, dismissing the 
action against defendant and discharging him. As shown 
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by the record, Respondent made and filed on May 29, 1951, 
a petition to vacate the order of October 20, 1949, and to 
order the defendant to appear before the Court and show 
cause why the order of October 20, 1949, should not be 
vacated. 
The only grounds alleged in said petition for vacating 
the order were ( 1) that a condition of the order was per-
manent departure from the State of Utah, which had been 
violated upon defendant's return to Utah, and (2) that the 
order was contrary to Article VII, Section 12, Utah Con-
stitution. No notice or suggestion was given in said peti-
tion of any other grounds for vacating the order. The cita-
tion which subsequently issued on the basis of said peti-
tion contained and was accompanied by no notice of any 
grounds for vacating the order other than stated above. 
At the hearing on said petition no claim or argument was 
made by Respondent as grounds for said petition other than 
those stated. No evidence was offered or introduced by 
Respondent bearing upon grounds for vacating the 1949 
order except those stated. At no time was a claim of fraud 
or misrepresentation in procuring said order made until the 
Judge who heard the case vaguely expressed such conten-
tions in his oral opinion after all the evidence was in; Now 
for the first time in its brief the Respondent seizes upon the 
vague and ambiguous remarks of the said Judge to fortify 
an argument that the court acted properly in vacating the 
order of October 20, 1949. The original grounds alleged by 
Respondent for vacating said order have now been aban-
doned and are conceded to be without merit. 
At page 4 of its brief Respondent states that a good 
argument can be made that the order of October 20, 1949, 
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was contrary to Article VII, Section 12, Utah Constitution, 
but the brief utterly fails to reveal the nature of that argu-
ment. The suggestion ignores the first sentence of the con-
stitutional provision which in unmistakable terms em-
powered the legislature to enact Section 105-36-17, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, as amended, pursuant to which said 
order was made. 
Respondent apparently no longer contends that the 
order contained a condition that defendant permanently 
remain outside the State of Utah. At page 13 of its brief 
Respondent quite frankly concedes that such a condition 
would be void. Thus Respondent concedes that the order 
of October 20, 1949, was a final, unconditional order, and 
submits as its only contention on this appeal the proposition 
that the court vacated the October 20, 1949 order, with 
authority to do so, on a finding of fraud, misrepresentations 
and deceit made to the trial court. In this Reply, therefore, 
Appellant will confine his discussion to that point. There 
are four aspects to that contention which require consider-
ation, and they are as follows : 
I. 
VACATION OF THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 
1949, ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD REQUIRED A 
FINDING OF EXTRINSIC FRAUD, WHICH 
DID NOT EXIST. 
Appellant does not take issue with the well established 
principle of law that a court has the power to vacate a 
judgment or an order where the judgment or order was 
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procured by fraud. As an abstract proposition, Respondent 
has correctly stated the law. Within the framework of this 
principle of law, however, there are definite requirements 
which must be present to invoke its operation. It isn't every 
variety of fraud which justifies invocation of the power. 
The authorities are in complete accord that the fraud must 
be of an extrinsic and collateral nature. 
31 Am. Jur. Judgments, Sections 735, 738; 
49 Corpus Juris Secundum, Judgments, Section 
269. 
This court has had frequent occasion to consider and 
apply the principle stated, and has consistently limited its 
application to cases of extrinsic fraud. 
Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 151 
Pac. 986; 
Anderson v. State, 238 Pac. 557; 
Logan City v. Utah Power & Light Co., 16 P. 
(2d) 1097; 
Rice v. Rice, 212 P. (2d) 685. 
The foregoing decisions, as well as the authorities else-
where, hold that a judgment cannot be set aside except for 
the most compelling reasons; they hold that fraud as to a 
matter or issue actually or potentially before the court does 
not constitute extrinsic fraud such as to constitute grounds 
for setting a judgment aside. Examples of extrinsic fraud 
are the following: Bribery of witnesses or preventing wit-
nesses from testifying, inducing a party by deceit to sub-
ject himself to the jurisdiction of the court, preventing a 
party from testifying, and other examples pertaining to 
collateral matters too numerous to mention. Misrepresenta-
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~ tion or perjury, even if established, as to a matter in issue 
or material to issues, does not constitute extrinsic fraud. 
~ Thus, in Cantlcell v. Thatche,r Bros. Banking Co., supra, 
this court refused to apply the principle where the alleged 
fraud was perjury as to issues actually or potentially pertin-
ent to the judgment. Again, in Anderson v. State, supra, this 
court held that an alleged conspiracy to mislead the court 
as to material issues and perjury did not constitute the type 
of fraud required to set aside a judgment. 
This limited application of the principle was again 
followed by this court in Logan City v. Utah Power & Light 
Co., supra, where the court held that alleged false and fraud-
ulent representations to the court as to material issues would 
not constitute extrinsic fraud. 
Now what is the alleged fraud or misrepresentation in 
this case upon which Respondent relies? The alleged fraud 
can pertain only to Appellant's alleged representations as to 
his health, the advisability of trying a different climate and 
Appellant's intention with respect to going to Florida and 
remaining away from Utah. Appellant is unable to de-
termine precisely which of these factors is the subject of the 
alleged fraud. In any event, whichever factor it is, it seems 
clear that the alleged fraud goes to an intrinsic matter, not 
an extrinsic one. The alleged fraud is similar to the alleged 
conspiracy to misrepresent in the Anderson case, supra, and 
the alleged perjury in the Cantwell case, supra. The verity 
of the representations was a matter actually or potentially 
before the court at the hearing of the October 20, 1949, order. 
In submitting the foregoing contention, Appellant does 
not for one moment concede that there was any fraud or 
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misrepresentation on his part and will demonstrate that 
position hereinafter. But for purposes of meeting the Re-
spondent's contention squarely, Appellant submits that the 
alleged fraud or misrepresentation was and is intrinsic, not 
extrinsic, and was therefore insufficient to have justified 
the court's action. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT A FINDING OF FRAUD OR MIS-
REPRESENTATION. 
Assuming the proposition that extrinsic fraud or mis-
representation is grounds for vacating a judgment or 
order, it seems clear that the order of vacation must be based 
upon a finding of fraud or misrepresentation. One can 
search the record in vain to find any competent evidence 
which is clear and substantial enough to warrant such a 
finding. The self-evident question arises: What evidence 
must there be to support a finding of fraud or misrepre-
sentation. Can such a finding be made on the basis of sur-
mise, speculation, suspicion, supposition, conjecture and 
heresay. Or must the finding be based upon evidence which 
strongly establishes a conviction as to fraud and misrepre-
sentation. In a criminal proceeding such as this, good rea-
son would appear for applying the orthodox rule that there 
must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This court has 
by way of dicta applied that orthodox rule to these very 
circumstances. 
In Anderson v. State, supra, the court made the fol-
lowing significant statement regarding the quantum of 
proof of fraud required to vacate a judgment. 
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"The alleged conspiracy between Cora and her 
mother is relied on as extrinsic fraud. The only 
evidence of conspiracy is the fact that they testified 
to the same effect. That is a circumstance to be con-
sidered, especially as the witnesses were separated 
by order of the court. But is the circumstance con-
clusive? Does it produce conviction beyond a reason-
able doubt? (Emphasis added.) 
Moreover this court has consistently followed the well 
established rule that a finding cannot be based upon sur-
mise, speculation, suppostion or conjecture. 
Dern Inv. Co. v. Carbon County Land Co., 75 P. 
(2d) 660, 94 Ut. 76; 
Spackman v. Benefit Ass'n of Railroad Em-
ployees, 89 P. (2d) 490, 97 Ut. 91; 
Mehr v. Child, 61 P. (2d) 624, 90 Ut. 348. 
It would not seem necessary in this case to determine 
whether the degree of proof required to show fraud or mis-
representation for vacating a judgment in a criminal pro-
ceeding is proof which establishes conviction beyond a 
reasonable doubt or proof of a lesser degree. It is clear that 
the evidence herein falls far short of any reasonable require-
ment. What is the evidence upon which the court made a 
finding of fraud and upon which Respondent defends that 
finding. Respondent has set out in its brief the evidence 
which it apparently deems strongest. 
At pages 7, 8 and 9 of its brief, Respondent refers to 
testimony of Dr. William Henning at the hearing of October 
20, 1949, and the hearing of June 9, 1951. This is offered 
by Respondent to show fraud and misrepresentation. The 
substance of the evidence at said pages is that Dr. Henning 
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believed in October, 1949, that Appellant's health was poor 
and that a change of altitude and climate was advisable· 
' 
and that the change did not produce the anticipated results. 
Is that evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. In fact, that 
testimony supports the representations made by Appellant 
in October, 1949, that it was advisable from a medical 
standpoint that Appellant try a different climate. Dr. 
Henning's statement as to letters received from Appellant 
in Florida supports the testimony that Appellant's health 
did not improve. By what distortion of the imagination can 
that evidence be said to show fraud or misrepresentation in 
procuring the 1949 order. 
Reference is made by Respondent at pages 9 and 10 
of its brief to testimony of Appellant at the two hearings 
to show fraud and misrepresentation. The evidence referred 
to contains no misrepresentation by Appellant as to his in-
tentions in October, 1949. All that testimony shows is that 
Appellant was a sick man and planned to try a different 
climate and intended to reside in Florida if that climate im-
proved his health. No contrary representation was made 
to the court. The important question is not what Appel-
lant's health subsequently required him to do but what his 
intention was at the time he applied to the court in October, 
1949, and whether he misrepresented those intentions. 
At pages 10, 11 and 12 of Respondent's brief, reference 
is made to alleged representations made by Appellant's at-
torney in October, 1949, as to Appellant's having a position 
in a Florida hospital. Is there any evidence that Appellant's 
attorney knew the alleged representations were untrue? Is 
there any evidence that the representations were untrue? 
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Respondent states at page 11 that Appellant's memory 
simply failed him on this matter. Can a finding of fraud 
-- and misrepresentation be predicated upon a lapse of mem-
ory? 
': .( 
It is said by Respondent at page 12 of its brief that 
Appellant acted in bad faith in going to a judge other than 
Judge Van Cott, in the Fall of 1950, for advice on the 
October, 1949 order. Does that show fraud in October, 
1949? Does it show anything except the fact that the 
Appellant was keenly anxious to determine his rights and 
went to see the presiding judge of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court to determine them, a man who had unquestioned 
authority to advise Appellant. 
It is important to re-emphasize the proposition that 
only extrinsic fraud or misrepresentation as to the procure-
ment of the October 20, 1949, order would constitute 
grounds for vacating the order. The essential nature of 
fraud or misrepresentation as applied here would be repre-
senting a matter to be otherwise than it was with knowledge 
of the falsity of the representations. The fraud or mis-
representation claimed against Appellant is, it would ap-
pear, representations made by him as to his intentions 
kno'Yn at the time to be untrue. The evidence referred to 
by Respondent in its brief does not prove or tend to prove 
that Appellant made representations to the court which he 
knew to be untrue. Only by conjecture, speculation and 
suspicion can a finding of fraud and misrepresentation be 
made. 
In contrast to the foregoing, the evidence is uncontra-
dicted that Appellant's health was bad in October, 1949; 
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that he was advised by a doctor to try a different climate; 
that he so advised the court; that Appellant closed his 
practice, stored his equipment, packed his furniture and 
physically moved with his family to a milder climate, where 
he remained long enough to determine that the climate 
did not improve his health. 
Appellant again emphasizes to the court the clear prop-
osition that the trial judge could not base a finding of 
fraud or misrepresentation upon extra judicial utterances 
and statements of unidentified persons. Respondent would 
apparently concede that such matters would not support 
the required finding. 
It is submitted, therefore, that the evidence herein 
was insufficient to support a finding of f"raud or misrep-
resentation in procurement of the October 20, 1949 order. 
III. 
THE ALLEGED FRAUD AND MISREPRE-
SENTATION GOES TO IMMATERIAL MAT-
T E R S AN D DOES NOT CONSTITUTE 
GROUNDS FOR VACATING THE ORDER OF 
OCTOBER 20, 1949. 
Respondent has conceded that the alleged condition 
of banishment from the State of Utah was void. Any 
representations concerning that matter would appear, there-
fore, to be immaterial. And as pointed out in Appellant's 
brief, banishment was not and could not be a mandatory, 
material basis for issuance of the October 20, 1949 order. 
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Appellant's position is that the said condition or matter 
being immaterial, any representations made concerning it 
would not constitute grounds for vacating the order. In 
order to raise fraud as a grounds for vacating a judgment, 
--- it must be shown that the fraud relates to a material issue 
or question entering into the judgment. The principle that 
fraud or misrepresentation as to immaterial matters is 




Metzler, 48 Pac. 37, 14 Ut. 408. For a general statement 
of this principle see 23 Am. Jur., Fraud and Deceit, Sec-
tion 111. Another analogous principle is the one of gen-
eral acceptance followed in this jurisdiction that a witness 
cannot be impeached on the basis of immaterial matters. 
IV. 
VACATION OF THE ORDER OF OCTOBER 20, 
1949, ON GROUNDS OF FRAUD OR MISREP-
RESENTATION WOULD UNDER THE CIR-
CUMSTANCES OF THIS PROCEEDING CON-
STITUTE A VIOLATION OF' DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTIONS 7 
AND 11 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND 
UNDER THE 14TH AMENDMENT TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. 
The essential elements of due process of law under 
the Constitution of the State of Utah and the Constitution 
of the United States are notice, and an opportunity to be 
heard and to defend in an orderly proceeding. 
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12 Am. Jur., Constitutional Law, § 573; 
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 54 S. 
Ct. 330; 
Denver and R. G. W. R. Co. v. Industrial Com-
mission, 279 P. 612, 74 Ut. 316. 
Due process of law requires that a defendant in a criminal 
proceeding be given notice of the grounds for which he 
is charged and a reasonable opportunity to appear and 
defend on those grounds. This requirement of notice under · 
due process of law has direct application to the facts of 
this appeal. As pointed out in appellant's introductory 
statement, at no time prior to the oral opinion of the trial 
judge at the hearing on the petition to vacate the October 
20, 1949, order was appellant given notice that the grounds 
charged were fraud and misrepresentation concerning pro-
curement of said order. Appellant's position is that if the 
order of vacation was based upon fraud and misrepresenta-
tion, the order was invalid as a violation of due process of 
law because no notice was afforded to appellant of that 
charge and no opportunity was given to defend upon it. 
The requirement that notice be given to a defendant 
of the grounds asserted for setting aside a suspended sen-
tence, a parole, or a dismissal is well established in this 
jurisdiction and elsewhere. 
Annotati-on, 54 A. L. R. 1471. 
One of the principle cases on this question is the Utah 
case, State v. Zolantakis, 70 Ut. 296, 259 Pac. 1044. That 
case holds that a convict having been granted a suspen-
sion of sentence during good behavior is entitled to notice 
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and· hearing on the grounds asserted for setting aside the 
suspended sentence before revocation of same. 
The court stated as follows at page 104 7 of the Pacific 
Reporter: 
"In this state the question here involved is one of 
first impression. The statute involved does not point 
out a method of procedure. The majority of this 
court are of the opinion that a person who has a 
sentence suspended during good behavior, without 
any limitation, is entitled to a hearing upon the 
question of whether or not he has complied with 
the conditions imposed; that such hearing must be 
according to some well recognized and established 
rules of judicial procedure; that defendant is en-
·,titled to have filed either an affidavit, motion, or 
other written pleading setting forth the facts relied 
upon for a.revocation of the suspension of sentence; 
that the defendant should be given an opportunity to 
answer or plead to the charge made; that a hearing 
should be had upon the issues joined; and that the 
defendant as well as the state be given the right of 
cross-examination. If we are correct in our conclu-
sion that the defendant has a vested right to his 
personal liberty during good behavior when so or-
dered without reservation in the original sentence, 
any proceeding failing in these essentials is error." 
(Emphasis added.) 
This court again said as follows under similar circum-
stances in State v. Bonza, 150 P. (2d) 970, at 972: 
"A defendant out of prison on probation is ac-
corded due process of law by the following steps, 
all of which were followed in this case: (1) The 
filing of a verified staten1ent or an affidavit in the 
case setting forth facts which show a violation of 
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the terms of probation. (2) The issuance of an 
order to show cause and citation thereon requiring 
the defendant to appear and show cause why pro-
bation should not be revoked, apprising defendant 
of the ground or grounds on which revocation is 
sought, and specifying a proper time for hearing. 
( 3) A hearing before the court on the question of 
violation of some term or condition of probation, 
at which the defendant has the opportunity to cross-
examine witnesses against him and also to present 
evidence to refute the claimed violation of the con-
ditions of probation. (4) A determination of the 
question, followed by entry of an appropriate order. 
State v. Zolantakis, supra." (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the foregoing decisions that due process 
of law under the circumstances of this case required that 
notice be given to the Appellant apprising defendant of 
the grounds upon which vacation of the October, 1949, order 
was based. No such notice was given with respect to the 
claim of fraud and misrepresentation. 
This case presents even stronger features for applica-
tion of the stated principle than either of the two Utah 
cases mentioned. This is not a situation where defendant 
continued after October 20, )949, to be subject to the jur-
isdiction and custody of the court. The October 20, 1949 
order dismissed the action against defendant and finally 
discharged him. The petition to vacate said order was in 
effect a new proceeding. Although the court has in recent 
decisions [McCoy v. Harris, 160 P. (2d) 721, 108 Utah 
407, Ex Parte Follett, 225 P. (2d) 16, ... Utah . ] stated 
that the Zolantakis principle should be confined to the facts 
of that case, it is believed that this case presents the facts 
essential for application of the principle. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant submits that the order of October 20, 1949, 
was a valid, final and unconditional order. The order can 
be deemed conditional only upon a consideration of parole 
evidence, which is improper. The alleged condition itself 
would, as conceded by Respondent, be void as contrary to 
public policy. Either one or all of the reasons stated by 
Appellant herein constitute valid and proper grounds for 
a holding that the trial court erred in vacating the October 
20, 1949 order. In view of the foregoing, Appellant urges 
the court to reverse the decision of the trial court and de-
ll clare the court's order of June 9, 1951, null and void and 







CLIFFORD L. ASHTON, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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